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a mess of things" during an operation on the plaintiff. The admissions
were the sole expert testimony presented by either plaintiff. Judgments
of non-suit were reversed in both cases, the California court stating that
the admissions were ambiguous, and that it was for the jury to decide
whether they were admissions of negligence.
It is important to note that each of the above admissions contained
the element of fault, even though they could also be interpreted as innocent
statements. Thus, where the plaintiff is attempting to prove his case solely
by defendant's admissions, the courts continually state that the admission
to be sufficient must be one of negligence or lack of skill and not an admission of a mere mistake in judgment or untoward result of treatrnent.'
In contrast, the ruling in the instant case might be interpreted as saying that an admission of an untoward result of treatment coupled with
expert testimony which establishes only that intentionally to obtain such
result is not acceptable medical practice amounts to an admission of negligence.
While upon the strongest view of the evidence, taken out of context,
the Montana Supreme Court may be justified in reversing a nonsuit in the
instant case, it would seem that its statements relating to the establishment
of malpractice through the admissions of the defendant should be applied
only with caution.
JOHN A. ALEXANDER

CRIMINAL LAW-CONVICTION ON ACCOMPLICE TESTIMONY-SUFFICIENCY
OF

CORROBORATING

EVIDENCE -Defendant

was convicted of first degree

burglary on the testimony of an accomplice and other evidence. The accomplice testified that while drinking in a bar he was approached by defendant and invited to participate in a burglary; that as he remained outside the victim's apartment, defendant forced the latch with a blue banded
strip of celluloid and entered; that after taking money and traveler's checks
they retired to a bar. Independent evidence established that the two were
together before and after the burglary; that defendant had in his possession
a celluloid strip with a blue band; that the defendant was arrested wearing
some of the clothing purchased by the accomplice with the stolen money
while on a shopping spree with defendant. On appeal to the Supreme Court
of Montana, held, affirmed. The testimony of the accomplice was sufficiently corroborated. State v. Harmon, 340 P.2d 128 (Mont. 1959) (Justices
Bottomly and Adair dissenting).'
Under early Montana law the testimony of an accomplice was sufficient
in itself to sustain a conviction. When the statutes were codified by the
territorial legislature in 1871 the requirement of corroboration was added.
'Lashley v. Koerber, 26 Cal. 2d 83, 156 P.2d 441, 444 (1945).
Physicians and Surgeons § 62 (1951).

See generally 70 C.J.S.

'The dissenting opinion considers at length other less important evidence presented
in the Instant case.
"Laws of the Territory of Montana, 1864, Criminal Practice Act § 12, at 178.
'Laws of the Territory of Montana, 1871-1872, Criminal Practice Act § 316, at 238.
The law provided that "a conviction cannot be had on the testimony of an accomplice, unless he be corroborated by such other evidence as shall tend to connect the
defendant with the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof."
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The statute, still essentially the same, acquired its present form in 1895.
It provides:"
Conviction on testimony of accomplice. Conviction cannot be had
on the testimony of an accomplice, unless he is corroborated by
other evidence, which in itself, and without the aid of the testimony
of the accomplice tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense, and the corroboration is not sufficient, if it
merely shows the commission of the offense, or the circumstances
thereof.
The statute has been the subject of considerable litigation.' Although
the cases tend to turn on their particular facts, some principles are established. The Montana Supreme Court in State v. Geddes' recognized that
in addition to the statutory requirement that corroborating evidence should
tend to connect the defendant with the crime charged, it must also corroborate the accomplice's testimony as to material matters. In State v.
Bolton' the court indicated that the evidence must be from an independent
source, and may be either direct or circumstantial. It is not necessary, however, that the accomplice be corroborated upon every fact to which he testifies. The Boltoz case also recognized that the corroborating evidence must
connect the defendant with the crime without the aid of the accomplice's
testimony.
The statutory phrase "tends to connect" is considered in State v.
Keckonen.' There the court stated:
[I]f the conclusion to be reached from the alleged corroborative
evidence is equally consonant with a reasonable explanation pointing toward innocent conduct on the part of the defendant, then
such evidence does not tend to connect him with the commission of
the offense, and 'any inference drawn from such testimony, however shrewd, is still in the realm of speculation.'
Further, in this connection, the Montana court in State v. Jones' held that
it is not sufficient corroboration if the evidence merely raises a suspicion
or probability that the defendant is linked with the crime charged.
These cases thus establish the following standards for determining the
sufficiency of corroborating evidence. (1) The evidence must corroborate
the accomplice's testimony as to some material matters. (2) It may be
either direct or circumstantial evidence. (3) It must be evidence from an
independent source. (4) The evidence must itself tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime, without the aid of the accomplice's testimony (5) Before it can be said to tend to connect the defendant
with the crime it must raise more than a strong suspicion, but it need not
be sufficient to establish a prima facie case of guilt.
1947, § 94-7220.
'Whether the corroborating evidence tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense is a question of law to be determined by the court. State
v. Cobb, 76 Mont. 89, 245 Pac. 265 (1926).
'22 Mont. 68, 55 Pac. 919 (1899).
'65 Mont. 74, 212 Pac. 504 (1922).
'107 Mont. 253, 84 P.2d 341 (1938).
'Id. at 261, 84 P.2d at 344.
195 Mont. 317, 26 P.2d 341 (1933).
'REVISED CODES OF MONTANA,
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The court in the instant case, although ostensibly adhering to the
statute and the cases decided thereunder, seems to have adopted a more
liberal view of the law, for the corroborating evidence here must be explained in the light of the accomplice's testimony before it tends to connect
the defendant with the crime charged. Without the aid of such testimony
the most that can be said is that a strong suspicion is raised.
The evidence showing defendant's possession of a celluloid strip becomes
significant only when it is revealed by the accomplice's testimony that such
was the method used to force the latch on the door. Since the accomplice's
testimony is the only evidence establishing the time of the offense, the fact
that the defendant and accomplice were seen together before and after the
burglary means little. Likewise, the defendant's association with the accomplice on the shopping spree may raise a suspicion, but mere suspicion
is not sufficient corroboration.'
The policy behind the rule requiring corroboration of an accomplice's
testimony is that he may expect favorable treatment for procuring the conviction of others.' Although an actual promise of immunity is not present
in most cases, this hope or expectation may always exist. Even so, the
feasibility of a fixed rule requiring corroboration may be questioned. At
common law the rule was only a caution given by the judge to the jury.'
Proponents of the common law practice argue that an unvarying rule should
not be applied to such an elusive subject as credibility of witnesses. Furthermore the likelihood of perjury depends in large measure upon the seriousness of the crime to which the accomplice must himself confess, and is
almost minimal in petty crimes. Dean Wigmore argues that the modern
rule only adds to the detailed refinements of present instructions, and increases the confusion of the jury, as well as providing defense counsel with
a built-in formula for obtaining new trials."
For the reasons stated above, it is submitted that the statutory requirement of corroboration might well be abrogated. However the desirability
of such a position is a question for the legislature. The court in the instant
case in failing to view the corroborating evidence without the aid of the
accomplice's testimony seems to have circumvented what appears to be the
clear intent of the present statute.
DONALD J. BEIGLE

"California under a statute somewhat similar to Montana's has ruled that the cor-

roborative evidence required by the statute must be considered without the aid of
the testimony which it is to corroborate. The evidence is not sufficient if it requires the interpretation and direction of such testimony to give it value. See People v. Sawaya, 46 Cal. App. 2d 466, 115 P.2d 1001 (1941). People v. Garrison, 80
Cal. App. 2d 458, 181 P.2d 738 (1947). People v. Reingold, 87 Cal App. 2d 382, 197
P.2d 175 (1948).

127 WIGMORE, EviliqcE
1It. at § 2056.

§ 2057 (3d ed. 1940).

"Id. at § 2057.
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